University of Ottawa. Th e article, which was translated from French by Catherine Leviten-Reid, is based on a presentation that was made at the Hétérodoxies MATISSE workshop, on December , , at the University of Paris . I am very grateful to Bruno Tinel and Liêm Hoang-Ngoc for having organised my visit there. I am also grateful to Eckhard Hein for having suggested to have an English version published in I and to Torsten Niechoj for having arranged the translation. I also wish to express my thanks to the two referees of the journal. A very slightly diff erent version is scheduled to appear in Spanish in the Colombian journal Lecturas de Economia, and has been published in French as »Les théories hétérodoxes ont-elles quelque chose en commun? Un point de vue post-keynésien«, in:
. Introduction
It is sometimes claimed that heterodox economists have nothing in common but their rejection of neoclassical theory -mainstream economics. Th e same could be true for one of the groups that make up heterodox economics, namely Post-Keynesians. Is this negative perception of heterodoxy really justifi ed? Do the numerous heterodox schools of thought within economics have something in common? If so, what is it that links Marxist economists, Sraffi ans (or neo-Ricardians), structuralists (in development economics), institutionalists, regulationists, social or humanist economists, anti-utilitarists, behaviourists, economists of conventions, Schumpeterians (or evolutionary economists), circuitists, feminist economists and many others? What are the common elements of the diff erent components within the Post-Keynesian school, namely the fundamentalist Keynesians, the Kaleckians and the Sraffi ans?
Heterodox schools are subjected to the infl uence of two opposing forces. On the one hand, they are prone to the overall divisions which occur in the sciences and in economics in particular. Here, each school has a tendency to specialise in the study of particular questions and tries to distinguish itself from the others. So at the same time as being complementary, these diverse heterodoxies are rivals, each one focusing its analyses on a particular aspect of the economic fi eld. Th is divisive tendency is reinforced by the behaviour of some researchers who need to diff erentiate their work at all costs or who very much need to exclusively validate their own ideas. Moreover, as Andreff () has pointed out, heterodox writers have a tendency to practice scientifi c agnosticism, which leads them to take issue with whatever ideas may be put forward, especially those from rival schools. Th is makes eff orts to unify the diff erent schools diffi cult to imagine.
But a counter tendency also exists which is caused, perhaps, by a situation in which minorities are in peril. Some heterodox researchers from diff erent schools have been prompted to advocate for interactions and to take steps to bring the diff erent schools together. Th is is particularly the case among US-American Post-Keynesians and Radicals (Marxists) in macroeconomics and monetary economics. In fact, one organisation, the International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism in Economics (ICAPE), regroups all heterodoxies and their institutions or journals. Th e existence of a seminar called »Heterodoxies« at the MATISSE (Modélisation Appliquée Trajectoires Institutionnelles Stratégies SocioEconomiques) is also perhaps a symbol of the necessity of building relationships between these schools. In addition, Steve Fleetwood, at the Institute for Advanced Studies at the University of Lancaster (England), has launched an ambitious program, the objective of which is to generate more intellectual exchange between heterodox economists of diff erent schools of thought.
As for me, I have always believed that heterodox economists had a number of things in common and shared numerous concepts, even if for very specifi c questions they could have quite diverging and distinct opinions. It seems to me that this is the lot of all economists, including neoclassical ones. It is normal that, even when sharing the same method or overall vision, individuals disagree on certain questions. Otherwise, they would no longer be ›individuals‹. three large groups: neo-Ricardians (Sraffi ans), Kaleckians, and Marshallians (fundamentalist Keynesians). According to Davidson ( -) , this broad defi nition is wrong: the only true ›Post-Keynesians‹ are, using Davidson's expression, fundamentalist Keynesians, meaning those whose analyses are based on the theoretical structure laid out by Keynes in the General Th eory. Th is means his Marshallian analysis, his monetary theory of the rate of interest, his explanation of unemployment based on liquidity and monetary characteristics and, fi nally, his notion of uncertainty.
Th is leads Davidson to explain in great detail that Kaleckians and Sraffi ans should be excluded from the Post-Keynesian school as thus defi ned. Th is also leads Davidson to excommunicate two people whom some consider to be the pillars of the Post-Keynesian school, his fellow US-Americans Hyman Minsky and Alfred Eichner (both of whom Davidson considers to be closet New Keynesians). In fact, other than a few and less wellknown followers, Davidson includes only a minimum of authors in the Post-Keynesian school: Sidney Weintraub (his old mentor), Basil Moore (a long-time friend), Anthony Th irlwall (who looks like Keynes) and Nicholas Kaldor (one wonders why, since he was quite critical of many features of Keynes's General Th eory, arguing that Kalecki's work provided better foundations). All the others are either omitted or expelled, including the most well-known of his former students, Jan Kregel. In a certain sense, none of this is very surprising. Davidson already showed some of his true colours during an interview with John King (), when already he wanted to challenge the usefulness of Sraffi an and Kaleckian works. Moreover, in his  book devoted to the defi nition of Post-Keynesian economics, Davidson cites only four of his Post-Keynesian contemporaries, omits Minsky from his index, and seems satisfi ed to cite the works of only the most seasoned neoclassical authors.
It seems clear enough to me that this type of sectarian behaviour or strategy is doomed to fail. Young readers of Davidson get the impression that he is the only worthy heterodox Keynesian, and that it is better to read the great neoclassical writers than other heterodox economists. His over-emphasis of the intellectual superiority of a single line of thought leads nowhere. Strength is found in numbers, even if the coalitions lack coherence or cohesion.
At the heart of the present paper is the belief that heterodox economists do have a lot in common, and the belief that heterodox economics goes well beyond the critique of mainstream economics. It is not necessary to try to imitate or compete with neoclassical economists on their own turf: heterodox economists do have their own turf and their own rules. Th e future of heterodox economics rests on the development of its own topics of analysis and on the choice of its own analytical tools. Th e ›negative‹ contribution of heterodox economics -especially the critique of hypotheses or methods used by neoclassical theorists -is something necessary and important. But heterodox schools cannot put all of their human resources, small in number compared to the neoclassical majority, into criticising theories about which they are generally not experts or into the study of the history of economic thought. An ever growing number of heterodox economists needs to provide a ›positive‹ contribution, by developing heterodox theories, gathering histori-cal facts or statistics that would be useful to the development of these alternative theories, and by devising empirical or econometric tests that would provide support for heterodox theories and improve their rhetoric. Finally, heterodox economists need to develop simplifi ed versions of theories which would allow for their transformation into pedagogical tools. Nature hates a vacuum, and it is in fi lling these gaps that heterodox economists will encourage more young researchers to adopt alternative visions and theories and to teach them in their classrooms.
In the following text, I will try to establish linkages between the diverse heterodox schools, particularly those that deal with macroeconomics. To Post-Keynesians, I will compare the works of those who represent the French Regulation school and the classical, or Marxist, school. I believe I can demonstrate that all these works have a number of points in common, even if their conclusions sometimes diverge.
I will not review all of the writings of each heterodox school of thought. Th at would be an impossible task. Moreover, I would not be able to address all of the specialised fi elds. To illustrate my claim, I will tackle four representative themes: the concept of rationality, price theory, growth theory, and fi nally the link between the real and the monetary analyses of economics.
. Rationality
In Lavoie (, b), I asserted that the distinctiveness of heterodox economics vis-à-vis neoclassical economics rested on four pairs of presuppositions. Th ese are: realism versus instrumentalism, organicism versus methodological individualism, production versus exchange, and procedural rationality versus substantive rationality. I still think that this way of looking at things is useful as long as these demarcations are not taken literally. Moreover, a number of heterodox thinkers adhere to these four presuppositions.
 I have since added a fi fth, and political, pair, which distinguishes those who believe in the undeniable virtues of the free market from those who favour regulation and state intervention (Lavoie ).
I do not want to belabour these methodological questions. While I was comfortable doing so during the fi rst debates in the s, discussions between methodologists seem to be increasingly hermetic to laymen. My positions stated above must also appear quite  Th is is surely the case for Post-Keynesians, as we can see in the readings of Setterfi eld () and Pasinetti (). I also believe this to be the case for Duménil and Lévy () . In their chapter on mainstream microeconomic theory (chapter ten), the words ›realism‹ and ›unrealistic‹ appear a number of times. Th ey also reproach the Neo-Walrasian production model for being nothing more than an extension of the pure exchange model, and they call for a procedural rationality based on the adjustment of observed disequilibria, as we will see later. Finally, they call for a class analysis which is compatible with the idea of organicism.
rudimentary to specialists.  Nonetheless, I would like to touch on the presupposition of rationality. Discussions with several heterodox colleagues have convinced me that this is a fundamental point that diff erentiates heterodox from neoclassical economists. Some could say it is actually an example of ›realism versus instrumentalism‹. Th is is perhaps the case, but let us still discuss the presupposition of rationality. For neoclassical economists, rationality is absolute: economic agents have full information, or have the means of getting it, or they have the data needed to calculate the optimal amount of required information. Moreover, neoclassical agents are able to deal with all of the information they have. Here, we do not even discuss the question of rational expectations where, above and beyond the information agents have, they are also perfectly aware of how the economy functions, all agents sharing the same model or prototype that allows them to understand economic dynamics.
It is clear that Post-Keynesians reject such a view of rationality either, as Herbert Simon would say, because it is impossible for economic agents to deal with the (imperfect) information that they are able to acquire (epistemic uncertainty) or because the world is nonergodic. Agents fi nd themselves swimming in full fundamental uncertainty, as Keynes, Shackle or Davidson would say, because the states of nature are uncertain (ontological uncertainty). Th e world is nothing but an open system that depends on the free choice of agents, who are also subjected to butterfl y eff ects. Many works by Keynesian economists put forward this fundamental uncertainty and the bounded rationality associated therein. Other works, notably by those who are interested in consumer theory, bring out a procedural or ecological rationality. Th is is based on non-compensatory choices in which decisions are made quickly and centred on a limited number of criteria, without having to make complex calculations of all substitution possibilities at all times.
But what about the other heterodox economists? When I was asked to write a paper on consumer theory that would serve as a foundation for a theory of sustainable forestry economics, I recently discovered that heterodox economists in the environmental fi eld (partisans of ecological economics) have been, for a good  years, proposing models of consumer behaviour that are very similar to those proposed by several economists of PostKeynesian infl uence. Steeped in the works of Galbraith and Georgescu-Roegen, these theories are essentially based on non-compensatory choices which cannot be represented by the usual neoclassical utility functions and which allow one to explain the paradoxes observed in contingent valuation studies of some environmental projects (Gowdy/Mayumi , Lavoie ).   Th e question of realism has been the object of several recent debates, notably through the impetus of Lawson () and his approach to critical or transcendental realism. Relying on Maki's () numerous defi nitions of realism, it seems that I am partial to ›realisticness‹ and not ›realism‹ properly defi ned.  In fact, I have also recently discovered that certain partisans of ecological economics demand that Sraffi an prices be used to correctly assess the prices that should be charged to companies that use renewable resources.
Th ere is also a very illuminating paper by Duménil and Lévy () [,] […] it applies to an institution, like a fi rm. We can also apply it to the banking system and the entire system that governs monetary policy.« It is also, at another level, a principle that applies to the French Regulation school: if a system no longer works, another system will progressively be put in place. For Godley, the principle of adjustment typically involves some target ratio. Th is ratio is generally a stockfl ow ratio, set by households, banks or fi rms, for instance an inventory to sales ratio in the case of the latter. Governments also give themselves target ratios, for instance defi citto-GDP or debt-to-GDP ratios.
In my  book, I maintained that the rules of thumb or routines of economic agents or institutions were not ad hoc (Lavoie : ). Duménil and Lévy reinforce this affi rmation by asking whether it is more ad hoc to assume that markets are always clearing or to assume that fi rms lower their production when they observe that their inventories are rising or that their sales are declining.  Duménil and Lévy propose a dynamic disequilibrium analysis and a procedural rationality that lie completely within the domain of Post-Keynesianism.  Amable et al. () also use the ›ad hoc‹ critique as a boomerang, showing that, because their microeconomic foundations lack realism, neoclassical authors are being forced to introduce a large number of ›ad hoc‹ elements, for otherwise their research programme would be completely sterile.
. Pricing . Prices of Production and Cost-plus Pricing
Since we have immersed ourselves in microeconomics, we might as well stay a little longer. One of the most controversial subjects in heterodox economics is obviously pricing theory. Here, Duménil and Lévy get along well with Sraffi ans since they essentially adopt the Sraffi an or classical idea of prices of production, putting aside labour values like the regulationists have done. Th e advantage of Duménil and Lévy's approach, at least compared to the earlier Sraffi ans, is that they do not assume the existence of long-period prices. Instead, they demonstrate that, under certain conditions, randomly set prices will eventually converge toward prices of production. Th is is the infamous gravitation problem, or the issue of the convergence toward prices of production, that has given many a French economist a headache, economists who are far more competent than me on this question.
Th e gravitation problem has led to the creation of several models, most notably crossdual models, which will be defi ned later. A variation on cross-dual models used by some, and especially French, heterodox writers is based on the hypothesis that short-period prices -market prices -are so fl exible that they allow for markets to be temporarily in equilibrium. I believe that this variation has been abandoned today because it does not accurately refl ect the way fi rms set prices in industrial markets and service markets. It is this variation that comes closest to the Walrasian approach, and it is the one that Duménil and Lévy () clearly challenged in their addendum to the  Siena conference.
What is left are gravitation models that are distinct from neoclassical theory. In their addendum, Duménil and Lévy () consider that there are two opposite types of convergence models. Th ere are two possible mechanisms to set prices. Th e fi rst one is put forward by Post-Keynesians and by Boggio (, ), and is based on the theory of costplus pricing. Th e simplest version of this theory is the mark-up on variable unit costs (à la Kalecki), while the most advanced is full-cost theory (or normal cost pricing), based on a targeted rate of return (Lanzillotti ) . Th e second mechanism for setting prices is that which is defended by Duménil and Lévy and Marxist economists in general, where prices evolve as a function of disequilibria (in quantities) between the supply and demand of goods. Th is second mechanism is the aforementioned cross-dual dynamics, since discrepancies between the profi t rate (normal or realized), or ›prices‹, lead to fl uctuations in production or production capacity, or ›quantities‹.
As surprising as this may seem, the position of contemporary Sraffi ans is fairly close to that of Kaleckians. In the past, and based on the works of dominant Sraffi ans like Garegnani (), or Eatwell and Milgate (), production prices were associated with quasi-stationary states of equilibria, and long-term classical or normal equilibria with normal capacity utilisation rates (fully adjusted, according to Vianello [] ). Th is makes normal output (with a normal utilisation rate) a long-period centre of gravitation. It is this interpretation, uninfl uenced by cyclical fl uctuations, that Roncaglia () and Arena (: ) have questioned for a long time.
Contemporary Sraffi ans, in agreement with Roncaglia and Arena, now maintain that fi rms can set production prices on the basis of a normal profi t rate even when the realized degree of capacity utilization is diff erent from the normal rate. According to Sraffi ans, prices of production are not necessarily associated with a long-run, classical equilibrium, with a normal realized output, or with a stationary state. In other words, it is not impossible for a Sraffi an to conceive of an economy where the realised profi t rate is diff erent from the normal level of the uniform profi t rate, because prices are set on the basis of the normal degree of capacity utilisation and not on the current degree of capacity utilisation. Th is is certainly the opinion of Ciccone () as well as of Palumbo and Trezzini (). As Roncaglia aptly states (: ), »existing fi rms too consider as unit costs, in their assessment of the situation, the sum of variable and fi xed unit costs computed not for current output levels, but for a ›normal‹ degree of capacity utilization.« Kaleckians, inspired by Kalecki as well as by authors that are closely associated with the Institutionalist school -Andrews (), Means or Eichner (who are notably those who are inspired by pricing theories based on full costs) -make precisely the same argument.
Th ere is also common ground between Post-Keynesian theories and new models of cross-dual dynamics. Th ese new convergence models add direct quantity adjustments or other non-linear adjustments (variations on observed disequilibria or the aggregate of observed disequilibria) to classical cross-duality. Th ese come close to Keynesian and PostKeynesian models, even more so when some of the models incorporate characteristics of price determination through cost-plus pricing since the mark-up on costs is the targeted change on the price side. Th is is not far from Boggio's () full-cost model, who is the main defender of cost-plus convergence models. In his model, observed disequilibria lead to progressive variations in the costing margin, thanks to the modifi cation of the targeted rate of return of the sector considered.
It therefore seems to me that there is nearly a convergence of opinion on this issue. In my opinion, given all that we know about how businesses set prices in the short term (Lanzillotti , Lee ), it seems diffi cult to deny that these prices are set based on the cost-plus procedure.
 Th e fl uctuations in the prices of intermediate inputs or in the cost of labour have a direct infl uence on current prices or on the prices of the next period, as has been shown by Coutts, Godley and Nordhaus () .
Th e question that remains is how to determine the targeted rate of return, or the normal rate of profi t, that helps set the mark-up or the costing margin over unit direct costs. Will this rate depend on conditions that only aff ect the sector in question, or will it depend on the rate of profi t realised elsewhere, or again on the profi t rate at equilibrium? Because of practical considerations, notably the challenges of obtaining the required information, it seems that the third possibility should be omitted while the second possibility is doubtful, except if one considers that competition occurs within holdings and conglomerates, and that they operate in a large number of sectors. As Boggio (: ) states, »the informations [sic] that the single fi rms [sic] receives about the ex-post rates of profi t prevailing in the rest of the economy are so scanty and imperfect, that its opinion about them must be considered largely independent from their true values.« Recent fi nancial scandals such as the Enron and WorldCom debacles or the even larger Nortel mess in Canada, as well as a number of similar, smaller-scale examples around the world, demonstrate that it is diffi cult to correctly evaluate the profi tability of a fi rm or industry. In my opinion, the entry and exit of capital has much to do with the growth rate of sales in a sector. Th is is an eminently observable variable that can serve as an estimate of the profi t rate that can potentially be achieved in the sector in question.
It is noteworthy that while the earlier Duménil and Lévy () seem to be very critical of the cost-plus approach, they later seem to adopt a more conciliatory attitude in Duménil and Lévy (: ). Here, although their equations refl ect the usual price setting mechanism used by classical authors, they write that
, prices do not depend on production costs (consequently, changing costs have no impact on prices). An alternative, and perhaps better, model would be a mark-up model in which the mark-up rate is adjusted instead of the price. We use equation () for simplicity.« Th us, at least in the short run, cost-plus pricing procedures seem acceptable to everyone. Each school has, nevertheless, its own model of long-run adjustment. But in fact, these are just diff erences in the specifi c way the problem is formalized. Duménil and Lévy (: ) as much as Post-Keynesians admit that short-run prices are essentially sticky. Th ey are not equilibrium prices because they do not have the goal of equalising current supply and demand. Short-run adjustments are essentially made through quantities, by changing production to adapt to demand, and by involuntary fl uctuations in inventories.
. Full Cost and Fundamentalist Post-Keynesians
Another source of tension, if we are to believe surveys of Post-Keynesian theory, is due to the Marshallian foundations of US-American Post-Keynesians -the fundamentalist Keynesians à la Weintraub and Davidson. It is true that the aggregate supply curves that they and their successors use seem to refl ect conditions of diminishing returns that Kaleckians associate only with a handful of industries or unusual circumstances. However, in the third chapter of Davidson () , his most polished work, Davidson shows that in many respects Marshall is closer to authors who advocate cost-plus price setting procedures than he is to modern neoclassical authors. In this chapter, Davidson refers to Marshall's normal profi t which he associates with normal profi t in Keynes's Treatise and the targeted rate of return with normal utilisation rates endorsed by Post-Keynesians from Cambridge. He adopts this price setting theory with enthusiasm.
Another characteristic of Davidson's chapter (: ) is his reference to the fact that, as Renaud du Tertre () showed in his huge PhD dissertation, the normal rate of return in the Treatise is determined by the current rate of interest on loans and a premium for enterprise, an idea that is also found in the General Th eory. Th is is precisely the contemporary Sraffi an theory of the normal profi t rate that is defended by authors such as Garegnani (), Panico () and Pivetti (). Th is idea was also advanced by Joan Robinson (), but she recanted when criticising Garegnani for daring to suggest the same idea! Yet, this conception of a normal rate of return that depends on the interest rate allows one to combine, without mixing them, real and monetary or fi nancial aspects of the economy. We also fi nd this notion of the costing margin being dependent on the (effective) interest rate in Godley (), because fi rms have to be able to cover the fi nancial cost of holding inventories. Th e advantage of a cost-plus theory is that it allows all these factors to be incorporated.
To conclude this section, I would like to go back to the notion of the labour theory of value. For certain Marxists, this is still a point that cannot be avoided. But these Marxists could be consoled and satisfi ed with the model put forward by the Sraffi an-Keynesian Luigi Pasinetti (). Pasinetti shows that the labour theory of value, if interpreted properly, is a good estimation of the value of commodities. In Pasinetti's model, as long as the profi t rate of a vertically-integrated sector is exactly equal to the growth rate in this sector, the price of a consumption good will be exactly proportional to the total of direct, indirect and hyper-indirect labour (the labour necessary to increase capacity at the rate of increase in demand). Pasinetti's model has indirect connections to theories of the fi rm proposed by Wood () and Eichner (). Th ese authors maintain that the targeted rate of profi t, or the costing margin, is proportional to the long-run growth rate estimated by the fi rm. As a result, although every heterodox economist seems to have his or her own pricing theory, these theories have a number of points in common which become entangled with one another. Th eir diff erences should not make us lose sight of their similarities. Th is is particularly the case in microeconomic theories that have often, wrongly, been put in opposition, such as those of Kalecki and Andrews and Brunner. Maybe one day we will be able to say the same about the debates surrounding the determinants of the evolution of targeted rates of return within sectors.
. Th e Kaleckian Model of Growth
Convergence models are not necessarily just models of price setting. Th ey also cover investment functions, and thus can at the same time be models of growth. Th is is because, from the classical point of view, adjustment to disequilibria or to an excessive or defi cient realised rate of return happens through investment or disinvestment (the entry or exit of entrepreneurs into a sector). An extremely fl exible model of growth is the Kaleckian growth model. It rests essentially on three equations: a price formation equation, an investment equation that depends on the rate of capacity utilisation, and a saving equation. Modifi cations to one or another of these three equations allow one to consider the many contributions of one or another of the major schools of heterodox thought, and also to consider the evolution of modern capitalism through diff erent regimes of accumulation. A Keynesian equilibrium condition is assumed; that is, it is assumed that the production period is long enough for production to adjust to demand.
 Th e Kaleckian model of growth is driven by eff ective demand. To it, however, one can add all kinds of complexities or restrictions. Th e model was fi rst presented by Alfredo Del Monte (), who ironically was a Neapolitan that was only marginally interested in heterodox economics. It has been extremely fruitful as it allowed for a number of concepts and ideas to be formalised within a relatively simple framework. It also allowed for the clarifi cation of certain diff erences between Post-Keynesian and Marxist theories, while at the same time bringing out their similarities. Finally, in some cases, the model brought about a kind of synthesis by demonstrating how one could go from a Keynesian (shortperiod) situation to a classical (long-period) situation, as is done by Duménil and Lévy () . Th e model can be made as complex as one wants. Variations on this model are almost limitless (see especially Dutt [] and Blecker [] ). In my opinion, the model is highly useful since it is a common reference for all macroeconomic heterodox schools, be they Kaleckian, Sraffi an, regulationist, Marxist or classical.
At fi rst glance, the Kaleckian model of growth resembles the Post-Keynesian or Cambridge model of growth of the s and s. But this resemblance is an illusion. Th e models of growth à la Kaldor, Pasinetti and Robinson suff ered from a crippling defect which was underlined fi rst by Davidson (:  f.) and also by Marglin (: ) and Vianello (). On the one hand, the Cambridge thinkers maintained that short-run adjustments were essentially made by variations in the rate of capacity utilisation. On the other hand, in these authors' models, all of the weight of adjustment was supported by variations in the costing margin by assuming the existence of a capacity utilisation rate equal to its normal value. At no point did these models explain the traverse from the short run (where capacity utilisation diverges from its normal degree) to the long run (where, by defi nition, utilisation rates go back to their normal level). Th ese models led to numerous debates which I have myself summarised long ago (Lavoie ), but which appear to be of low relevance today, even though some of these debates linger still.
. Th e Issue of the Normal Rate of Capacity Utilisation
In the Kaleckian model of growth, unlike the old Cambridge models of growth, there is no schizophrenia between the short and long run. Capacity utilisation rates are endogenous as  I also believe that more realistic models have to, instead, consider that production and sales diverge most of the time. Th ese models must therefore take into consideration fl uctuations in inventories, in accordance with Duménil and Lévy, on the one hand, and Godley on the other. much in the short run as they are in the long run. If the utilisation rates go back to their normal level, this move has to be demonstrated within the framework of the model and not by making it an assumption. As I mentioned earlier, the Kaleckian model is at the juncture point of the diff erent strands of macroeconomic heterodox theory. Th e proof is that many of the contributions to the understanding and extension of the Kaleckian model come from economists who, more often than not, are more properly labeled Marxists or Sraffi ans, and not Post-Keynesians. In fact, the Marxist Robert Rowthorn () is the one who truly launched this kind of modeling by incorporating to the Kaleckian model a distinction between blue collar and white collar workers, the possibility of technical progress  , a share of endogenous profi ts, and a discussion of the stability conditions of the model. Simultaneously, and ironically, the Kaleckian model was also developed at M.I.T. by students of Lance Taylor, a structuralist of development. Th ese students included Amitava Dutt and Edward Amadeo.
Th e fi rst models primarily brought out the existence of two paradoxes that were valid as much in the long run as they were in the short run: the paradox of thrift, well known among Keynesians, and the paradox of costs, where an increase in real wage costs leads to an increase in the realised profi t rate for a given technology, due to an acceleration in the growth rate. Th ese models allow economists to break away from a growth barrier, according to which an increase in the growth rate, except in the case of technical progress, is necessarily associated with a decrease in real wages. On this point, Kaleckians and Sraffi ans are in absolute agreement since contemporary Sraffi ans reject this growth barrier. Its origins can be found in Joan Robinson's () Accumulation of Capital and in the Sraffi an model of production prices with balanced growth (Spaventa )
For contemporary Sraffi ans (Garegnani [] included, see also Kurz [] and Garegnani and Palumbo [] ), demand creates its own productive capacity and there is no necessary negative linkage between the rate of accumulation and real wages, precisely because of the fl exibility of the productive capacity utilization rates. Contemporary Sraffi ans therefore attach great importance to the principle of eff ective demand, which they consider to be relevant both in the short and in the long run. I would assert that the dichotomy established by Carvalho ( -), in which Sraffi ans were only interested in the long period while other Post-Keynesians were mostly interested in the short period, is no longer valid.
 Th e fact that at least some Sraffi ans are interested in short-run questions became even more evident when, in the s, they embarked upon quite exhaustive critiques of Kaleckian models, notably that of Amadeo () . Th e critiques made by Ciccone ()  Questions about the appearance and distribution of the fruits of technical progress, a subject which regulationists and Schumpeterians have at heart, can be treated in the framework of a Kaleckian model of growth, as Rowthorn (), Kurz () and You () show.  I have to recognise, however, that the works of certain Sraffi ans sometimes seem most contradictory, as they wish both to keep the relevance of production prices and to make long-run equilibria immutable.
and Committeri (, ) allowed for the clarifi cation of the new Sraffi an point of view on this issue. Th ey also advanced the debate by forcing Kaleckians to make a distinction between the utilisation rate anticipated for the current period and the normal utilisation rate (the targeted long-run utilisation rate). Th ese authors, with Auerbach and Skott () and then Park (), also started a debate regarding the following question: can we talk about a long-run equilibrium when the equilibrium utilisation rate diverges from what is judged to be the normal rate? Th is debate is also at the heart of the critiques made by Duménil and Lévy (b) against their regulationist colleagues from CEPREMAP (Centre Pour La Recherche Economique Et Ses Applications), who were said to be adopting Keynesian conditions which are valid for short-run analysis but not for studying longrun issues. Th e debate prompted certain participants to incorporate additional adjustment mechanisms with the objective of forcing realised utilisation rates to converge toward the normal rate (Duménil / Lévy [] ). But could it be that the normal rate of utilisation is itself endogenous, thus preserving the endogeneity of realised rates of capacity utilisation even in the long run, when the two rates become equal? Some authors give a positive answer to this question (Lavoie , ).
. Th e Issue of the Investment Function
Th e Kaleckian model also allowed Marxist economists to voice their own concerns by establishing the possibility of several accumulation regimes, thus demonstrating that the regime corresponding to the paradox of costs could only be one growth regime among others. In this area, it is the article by Bhaduri and Marglin (), a leftist Kaleckian and a Marxist, respectively, that had the largest infl uence. Th ese authors modifi ed the investment function used by Kaleckians by emphasising that the realised rate of profi t was in fact a product of three factors: the inverse of the capital to capacity ratio, the realised rate of utilisation and the profi t share in the economy which, in a simplifi ed world, is equivalent to the profi t margin. From there, Bhaduri and Marglin () demonstrated that if a higher real wage rate can have a positive impact on consumption, it can also have an even greater negative impact on investment. Th ey then established the existence of three diff erent growth regimes which show similarities with those established by regulationists (Bowles / Boyer ), notably regimes where increases in real wages slow the economy down, as is feared by some Marxists.
A similar Kaleckian model was simultaneously formalised by the Sraffi an Heinz Kurz (). Like Bhaduri and Marglin, Kurz slightly modifi ed the Kaleckian model of growth by adding an investment function that depends on the rate of capacity utilisation and the normal rate of profi t; that is, the profi t rate that would be realised if capacities were utilised at their normal rate. Kurz, who added a few complexities to the model by introducing indirect labour and productivity considerations, also fi nds a multitude of growth regimes that can additionally be compared to those of regulationists based on the sharing of productivity gains. Kurz's model was taken up by Olivier Bruno () who, to the quantity dynamics already present, superposed a price dynamics where the variations in costing margins depend on disequilibria between supply and demand. Bruno therefore obtains equilibria that are path-dependent. In other words, it is a hysteresis model with multiple equilibria, where the equilibrium eff ectively achieved depends on the parameters of behaviour during the transition. Other Kaleckian growth models with hysteresis and path dependency have also been formalised, by other means, by Lavoie () and Dutt ().


. Class Confl ict and Economic Activity
Other key Marxist ideas have been formalised within the framework of the Kaleckian model of growth. Marxists, at least US-American Marxists, often assert that falling unemployment or an increase in capacity utilisation rates lead to greater bargaining power when wages are negotiated. Th is can be formalised in the price equation of the Kaleckian model by making the profi t margin, or the profi t share, an endogenous variable which is non-linear with regard to the capacity utilisation rate. Th is means that the relationship between the profi t share and the capacity utilisation rate eventually becomes negative, which therefore results in a bell-shaped relationship between the profi t rate and the utilisation rate seen from the supply side. Th is was presented by David Gordon (, ) and is also found in the work of regulationists Bowles and Boyer (), whose curves were derived from an analysis of effi ciency wages. Once again, these modifi cations create a multiplicity of cases and complicate the analysis of stability.
More recently Stockhammer () built a Kaleckian model of growth where, following Gordon's hypothesis, a higher unemployment rate leads to a rise in the profi t share of fi rms, and where the accumulation rate is proportional to this profi t share. With an exogenous growth rate (the ›natural‹ growth rate), it allows the author to take an equilibrium rate of unemployment into account, to establish the presence of several diff erent regimes, and to demonstrate that the realized unemployment rate always depends on eff ective demand despite the presence of a natural growth rate.
 Th e analysis of power struggle between workers and capitalists brings the question of infl ation into these models of growth. Kaleckians as well as US-American Post-Keynesians often favour the notion of confl ictual infl ation which is built around struggles for income distribution. Th is can easily be integrated into Kaleckian models of growth (Taylor , Cassetti , Lavoie ). Of course, the bargaining power of diff erent actors can evolve as a function of demand-related variables such as capacity utilisation rates. Some presentations, such as that of Duménil and Lévy (), easily lend themselves to a comparison with the New Keynesian models in the New Consensus (the new neoclassical synthesis), especially if one superposes on these new monetary consensus models a theory of endogenous growth (Lavoie / Kriesler, forthcoming).
 It is interesting to note that Duménil and Lévy (b: ) also propose a model subject to ›path dependency‹. Th e equilibria of this model can depend on values taken by the reaction parameters during the transition.  A recent work by Dutt () shows the diverse mechanisms that could lead to the convergence of the natural growth rate and the demand-driven growth rate. Th ese two rates can be endogenous.
Th e latest developments of modern capitalism have brought out another kind of confl ict, that between managers (white collar workers) and employees. Th is is the question of managerialism and of its relationship with fi nancial capitalism, recently highlighted by Duménil and Lévy (, ch. ) . Th e question of changes in relative pay between managers and employees can easily be incorporated into a Kaleckian growth model, as shown recently by Palley (), but also by Lavoie (b) in a model with a targeted rate of return, even though the paper does not explicitly refer to managerialism.
As emphasised by Cordonnier () in a recent paper presented at the MATISSE seminar on heterodoxies, other characteristics of modern capitalism are the importance of shareholders, changes in the propensity to consume caused by rising fl uctuations in the stock market, and the larger proportion of corporate revenues being distributed to households. Cordonnier basically uses the static Kaleckian model to represent these changes and their consequences. Naturally, once again, these could easily be analysed in the framework of the Kaleckian model of growth by modifying and making the saving function more complex (because it depends on the diff erent components of revenue) in order to take interest payments and the class of rentiers into account. One can fi nd similar ideas in the works of Marxist and Post-Keynesian authors, such as Epstein () or Hein and Ochsen ().
. Integrating Money and Finance Into Macroeconomic Models
Th e introduction of monetary factors allows us to move on to what strikes me to be the most important change in the evolution of the diff erent strands of macroeconomic heterodoxy over the past ten years. Th is concerns the eff orts devoted by these diff erent strands to address the question of integrating the real and the fi nancial aspects of macroeconomics. It has been the most challenging question for a number of colleagues for ages, so much so that the expression -the integration of money -seems to be nearly devoid of any useful meaning. But it seems that if heterodox schools have something in common today, it can be found in the multiple attempts to tackle questions of growth and unemployment within theories and formalizations that put much emphasis on monetary and fi nancial phenomena. We could obviously state that this apparent convergence among heterodox schools is the result of the fi nancialisation of our current capitalist system. Th ere is truth in this, but I also think that diff erent heterodox schools of thought have come to the conclusion that, to the best of our abilities, we need to address real and fi nancial problems at the same time. Th is is both because they are inextricably linked and for reasons of coherence.
In the past, save perhaps a few exceptions, heterodox economists specialised either in the study of real or monetary questions. Even those who were interested in both aspects had trouble formalising direct links between the two. Some of my own work illustrates this failing. As I highlighted earlier, Kaleckian models of growth started to integrate real and fi nancial features only in the s. It is quite signifi cant, I believe, that various economists are fi nding in the works of older scholars elements of monetary economics that had remained in the background. Th us, we are now discovering in Joan Robinson's Accumulation of Capital (), up to now only recognised as a serious treatise on growth and technical choice, that there are several chapters devoted to an original analysis of monetary theory (Rochon ). Similarly, Alfred Eichner (), associated especially with studies of the fi rm and price setting, is now drawing attention for his use of fi nancial fl ow accounts in his monetary theories. Finally, Stockhammer () brings out elements that have long time been set aside, those being the fi nancial constraint of fi rms and the propensity of fi rms to hold large proportions of fi nancial assets instead of holding tangible assets. Th ese were themes addressed by Adrian Wood () from Cambridge in his price-setting studies.
Regulationists like Aglietta et al. () , Boyer (), Plihon () as well as Passet and du Tertre () have also observed in great detail the changes that characterise modern capitalism. Th ey have sought to explicitly model the role of fi nancial variables in models of growth as well as the fi nancial norms, such as return on equity, which pension funds and mutual funds have attempted to impose upon the managers of non-fi nancial fi rms. Th is is also true for Marxists: while they are concerned with the fi nancing of capital accumulation, they also now explicitly formalise certain fi nancial variables. Such is the case for Shaikh () and Duménil and Lévy (), whose book is completely devoted to analysing the evolution of fi nancial capitalism. For these authors, the evolution of monetary policy and the evolution of interest rates play a key role in explaining economic cycles.  Hyman Minsky's ideas, which describe Wall Street capitalism and the importance of fi nancial variables in decision making related to real variables, had an enormous infl uence on all heterodox schools, especially on regulationists and US-American Marxists, and not just on Post-Keynesian authors. Even if there is disagreement about the validity of some of the lessons drawn from his fi nancial instability hypothesis, Minsky nonetheless encouraged a number of heterodox authors, particularly young researchers, to take fi nancial ratios into consideration and to model them when analyzing the evolution of an economy or setting up a macroeconomic model. Th is is also related to the renewed interest in the works of Joseph Steindl (), a once-forgotten Kaleckian who also sought to integrate fi nancial and real variables.
Th ese monetary concerns have also aff ected Sraffi ans. Some have taken up the study of monetary theories tackling, as previously mentioned, the relationship between the level of interest rates and the determination of the normal profi t rate. Young Sraffi ans like Park () devote entire articles to adequately formalising the introduction of the banking sector or fi nancial conditions in a model of growth with prices of production. In this area, Peter Skott's study () gave the tone to an entire research program integrating real and fi nancial variables. To do so, he extended Kaldor's () neo-Pasinetti model, who quite remarkably introduced the stock market into a Cambridge growth model.
 Th e convergence toward what could be labeled as Post-Keynesian preoccupations is illustrated by the fact that Post-Keynesians Deprez and Dalendina () criticized Duménil and Lévy precisely because they felt that these authors did not pay enough attention to fi nancial variables. Such a critique could not be made anymore.
In my opinion, the present eff orts devoted to the integration of real and fi nancial variables explain the renewed interest in the works of Wynne Godley, works that I have been familiar with since . Godley and Cripps's book () was a response to the monetarist critiques of Keynesian models in which, with the exception of the works of Tobin and some of his colleagues that were subsequently abandoned, the real and the monetary variables were not integrated well enough. Godley and Cripps's book, despite or perhaps because of its originality (notably by requiring a coherence between stocks and fl ows and by advocating the building of models based on stock-fl ow norms and ratios), had almost no impact among heterodox economists. Godley's most recent works like Godley (), however, are generating much interest, at least among economists like Anwar Shaikh (Godley/Shaikh ) and Lance Taylor ().
Godley proposes a coherent accounting framework that allows for the integration of the real and the monetary variables. Th is is his transactions-fl ow matrix, accompanied by a balance sheet matrix, which could already be found in Godley and Cripps () . Th e budget constraint of each sector takes revenue and expense fl ows, linked to real activities, into account, but it also must take into consideration changes in the acquired assets and the incurred debts. All fi nancial assets must have explicit counterparts. Th e accounting framework proposed by Godley allows one to be reassured that nothing has been left out and that all data are coherent.
 Moreover, as Taylor (: ) confi rms, this accounting framework and the restrictions imposed by the coherence of stocks and fl ows »remove many degrees of freedom from possible confi gurations of patterns of payments at the macro level, making tractable the task of constructing theories to ›close‹ the accounts into complete models.« In fact, Anwar Shaikh considers that this accounting framework, that can be modifi ed at will to simplify or to integrate more pressing questions, could provide a common base for all heterodox macroeconomic theoreticians. It would constitute the alternative to the principle of constrained maximisation in neoclassical theory. Th is is also the opinion of other New School University economists since, in their recent presentation synthesising heterodox models of growth, Foley and Taylor () adopt a slightly modifi ed transactions matrix.
To this accounting framework, Godley's models add Post-Keynesian behavioural equations. Th ey also add linearised portfolio equations à la Tobin, with diff erent adding-up constraints, which allow for the real and the monetary variables to be integrated by dealing in a consistent way with both the banking system and the central bank as well as the production and inventory problems of the fi rm. Th e framework put forward by Godley and the portfolio equations he uses very much allow for money to be considered both as a fl ow, as circuitists would like, and as a stock, as Keynes recommended. Godley's accounting framework guarantees the coherence between stocks and fl ows (an objective held by neoclassical authors as well), allowing heterodox authors to construct alternative and  I notice regularly as a journal referee that these basic accounting relationships are not always respected.
consistent macroeconomic models through the introduction of Post-Keynesian or Marxist behavioural equations.
Th e extension of this method to the open economy sphere also allows for the rediscovery and validation of certain heterodox assertions. Th is includes the compensation thesis that was supported by Bank of France economists in the s (Berger ) . According to this thesis, it is possible to control the interest rates in an open economy with fi xed exchange rates since foreign reserves arising from balance-of-payment surpluses are compensated by the reduction in other items of the central bank balance sheet, as a result of the normal behaviour of economic agents (Godley/ Lavoie  -).
Godley's accounting framework is very much fl exible.  Th ose able to use it for simulations can model problems of debt, equity capital, banks or production fi rms as they like. Th ey can also model problems of market speculation by adding adequate equations for household behaviour or fi nancial institutions. Dos Santos and Zezza (), for example, do this by departing from the basic model suggested by Lavoie and Godley ( -) which includes only households, a simplifi ed banking sector, and fi rms that fi nance their investments by issuing equities or by borrowing from banks. Th ey superpose a government sector, a central bank and equations related to productivity and infl ation.
. Conclusion
Th e present text only tackled four issues in economics. I could have also dealt with the works on technical progress that provide a direct link between regulationists (Boyer / Petit ) and Post-Keynesians (McCombie / Th irlwall ). I apologise once again for being partial in my choice of topics. To answer the question I asked at the beginning, yes, I believe that heterodox theories have a number of things in common. Beyond their methodology and their conception of rationality, heterodox authors share a pricing theory that has a number of similarities. Th ey all draw on a very fl exible tool -the Kaleckian model of growth. Founded on the principle of eff ective demand, this model can be used to study a very large number of macroeconomic questions by introducing a variety of theories and hypotheses. Finally, I believe that at this moment, there is an extraordinary convergence among heterodox macroeconomists who are trying, through diverse means, to incorporate fi nancial and monetary questions in the framework of models dealing with real variables. Moreover, a window of opportunity has now opened for heterodox theories since the intervention procedures of central banks are fully consistent with the monetary theories that have been advocated by heterodox writers for more than forty years. Heterodox economists certainly have the means and the models to criticise and modify the New Consensus model developed by New Keynesians and researchers of central banks.
 It can be cumbersome however. Taylor () seems to suggest the use of fi nancial fl ow and balance sheet matrices as a reminder only, relying on reduced form equations instead of entire sets of equations.
Despite the diversity of heterodox economics, I believe we have to recognise the convergences that have been outlined above. I attribute these convergences to the reciprocal infl uence that the various schools of thought have had on one another. Despite the centrifugal forces which are related to the hyper-specialisation that threatens us all, heterodoxies are not entirely divided. Bridges exist between the diff erent schools, and there are researchers who are ready to cross them. Although it might be wishful thinking, it seems to me that with respect to the Post-Keynesian school, the once dominant established versions (to use Richard Arena's expression [] ) are now losing ground to the dissident versions which are less rigid and more eclectic.
I would like to conclude by citing Luigi Pasinetti (: ). Pasinetti was marveled by the brimming ideas among heterodox economists at Cambridge, and regretted that none of them ever tried to propose a synthesis of their common comprehension of economics:
»Th e main wrong that we could do them would be to adopt the easier attitude that we should follow them closely, as individuals, focusing on the singularity of their conceptions, the idiosyncrasies of their behaviour and the emotionalism of their reactions. Th is would not favour the development of the seminal ideas that they left us [.] […] It seems that it is exactly this kind of behaviour we have to be wary of if we want to avoid rigidity or mental blocks precisely when fl exibility and openness of spirit are indispensable«.
